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CHAPTER 35

EVALUATION OF YOUTH IN THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
RANDY OTTO AND RANDY BORUM
FLORIDA MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA

The relationship between forensic clinical psychology and the juvenile courts and
juvenile justice system is a special one. Psychologists and other mental health professionals have been involved in the juvenile courts since their inception a little over
100 years ago, and some commentators have offered that forensic psychology can
trace its roots to psychologists’ involvement in juvenile matters (Otto & Heilbrun,
2002). In this chapter, after providing an overview of the juvenile justice system and
its history, we review a number of clinical issues critical to understanding adolescents and their involvement in the juvenile justice system, and we finish with a
discussion of the law and clinical factors surrounding evaluation in this context.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The juvenile court and juvenile justice system are relatively new legal institutions,
having just celebrated their 100-year anniversaries a few years ago. The first juvenile court came into existence in Illinois in 1899, and other states rapidly adopted
the concept thereafter (Grisso, 1998a). Indeed, the impact of the first juvenile
court has even expanded beyond the borders of the United States since special
courts for juveniles exist in almost all developed nations (Zimring, 2000). Prior
to the establishment of juvenile courts, minors age 14 and older who were accused
of criminal acts were processed through (adult) criminal court and received
adult sanctions (Tanenhaus, 2000). Children between the ages of 7 and 14 were
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY
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presumed incapable of forming criminal intent, but this was a rebuttable presumption. Those who were found to have such capacity were also adjudicated in
criminal court, while those without such capacity were not sanctioned. Children
below the age of 7 were considered simply to lack capacity to form the requisite
criminal intent and were not subject to criminal sanctions.
The juvenile court is considered to be the product of two separate but related
developments in the United States. With the transition from an agrarian to an
industrial economy, implementation of compulsory education laws, and adoption
of child labor laws at the beginning of the twentieth century, the age at which
persons took on adult tasks, roles, and responsibilities was delayed. These changes
were accompanied by formal and scientific recognition (some have suggested
invention) of the developmental stage of adolescence. Adolescents, though they
clearly showed greater cognitive, emotional, and behavioral capacities than their
younger counterparts, were considered not to possess the same capacities as
adults. Whereas the law presumed adults to possess free will, to be in control of
their behavior, and to fully appreciate the nature and consequences of their
actions, developmental psychologists and others argued that adolescents’ capacities in these areas were more limited. Accordingly, providing adolescents with the
same legal privileges and responsibilities as adults was considered inappropriate,
as was holding them equally responsible or culpable for their criminal acts. The
juvenile court was to consider criminal behavior of minors in its developmental
context, with a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and a diminished emphasis on
punishment (Zimring, 2000).
The juvenile court and the juvenile justice system have undergone significant
changes over time. Because the juvenile court was to be more rehabilitation
focused and less punitive than adult courts, psychologists, social workers, and
other mental health professionals played a significant role in all aspects of adjudication and disposition, and the legal proceedings were less formal than in (adult)
criminal court. Indeed, such procedural formalities were considered by some to
be counterproductive (Mnookin, 1978). The lack of strict legal procedures was
not seen as problematic and was considered to constitute something of a tradeoff in return for the goals of the proceedings, which were ostensibly rehabilitative
rather than punitive. However, beginning in the 1960s, questions were raised about
whether the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile justice system was being met. Some
claimed that the juvenile court and juvenile justice system were, in some ways, no
less punitive than the adult criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court offered its opinion of the juvenile justice system in a
series of cases in which the constitutional protections that were due children in
juvenile proceedings were at issue. Its commentary was not positive. In a 1966
case in which the Court considered the appropriateness of transferring a minor
to be tried in the criminal court without benefit of any hearing (see later for
further discussion of transfer provisions), the majority offered that a child
involved in the juvenile court “gets the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither
the (procedural legal) protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
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regenerative treatment postulated for children” (Kent v. United States, 1966, p.
556). The next term, in the case of In re Gault (1967), the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to delineate the constitutional rights afforded to juveniles who were
subject to delinquency proceedings. The Court, noting that a minor appearing in
juvenile court was not provided with many of the basic rights granted to adult
defendants appearing in criminal court, including the right to notice of the
charges, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to avoid self-incrimination, compared the juvenile court operating in Arizona to a “kangaroo court.” In its decisions in Gault, Kent, and In re
Winship (1970), the Supreme Court took notice that the rehabilitative ideal of the
juvenile court and juvenile justice system might have been diminished, and it made
clear that juveniles accused of offenses were entitled to most of the same procedural rights and safeguards granted to their adult counterparts. In response, juvenile proceedings became somewhat more formal and structured, although overall
they remain less formal than adult proceedings.
Perhaps the next significant development in the administration and operation of the juvenile court and the juvenile justice system occurred in the late 1980s,
when the majority of states revised their juvenile codes in response to increased
public fear of juvenile crime (Grisso, 1996). Although the specific changes
adopted by different jurisdictions varied, their net effect was to emphasize the
punitive and incapacitating roles of the juvenile justice system and diminish the
emphasis on rehabilitation (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000). Despite these changes,
however, the juvenile justice system continues to devote more resources to rehabilitation than the adult criminal justice system, and intervention and treatment
remain priorities in many juvenile justice systems.

CLINICAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO JUVENILE FORENSIC EVALUATION
Central to forensic assessments of juveniles charged with an offense are three
substantive clinical issues: (1) psychosocial maturity and developmental status, (2)
risk for future offending or violence, and (3) the nature and extent of the juvenile’s antisocial behavior and character. We review each of these areas, then
discuss the specific psycholegal questions to which they most frequently are
applied.
Maturity and Development
Children and adolescents—by definition—are in a constant state of change. Their
capacities and characteristics are evolving physically, cognitively, socially, and
emotionally. This fluid developmental status is part of what sets them apart from
adults (Borum, in press; Borum & Verhaagen, in press; McCord & Spatz-Widom,
2001; Rosado, 2000; Griffin & Torbet, 2002; Grisso, 1998a).
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In criminal and juvenile justice matters, the law is often interested in a
juvenile’s degree of “sophistication” or “maturity” to inform decisions about
culpability and disposition (see Kent v. United States, 1966). The issue of how
those inferences should be made, however, has been much less clear. Too often, a
youth’s maturational status is imputed based on his or her age, physical development, or severity of the alleged offense. None of these factors, however, serves
as a reliable proxy for true psychosocial capacities (Grisso, 1998; Steinberg &
Schwartz, 2000).
It is true that most developmental psychology textbooks have some type
of chart or matrix that shows the ostensible age at which certain characteristics
typically emerge. The reality of human development, though, is that there is great
variability in the age and rate at which different cognitive, social, or emotional
capacities develop (Grisso, 1996; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996, 1999). And charts
that purport to display a “typical” or “average” progression may have even more
limited applicability to youth who are in the justice system. Those normative estimates often are based on Caucasian middle-class children, whereas minority
youth living in poverty are the ones most disproportionately represented in the
justice system. Research has demonstrated that economic disadvantage may delay
or inhibit certain developmental capacities, so the “average” trajectory of these
youth may be expected to differ (Grisso, 1996, 1998a).
Physical development, while easy to gauge, is an unreliable marker of psychosocial maturity (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000). Different capacities and characteristics in physical, cognitive, social, and emotional realms emerge and develop
at different rates that are not necessarily related to one other. It is easy (and problematic) to assume that a young person who is physically well developed and looks
older that his age (e.g., tall, mature features, facial hair) must have all the concomitant cognitive and social capacities that one would expect of an older person
(Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000a, 2000b).
The severity of the index offense is similarly a poor marker of a youth’s
developmental status. Philosophies and slogans such as “adult time for adult
crime” belie an assumption that a youth who commits a more serious offense (e.g.,
homicide) must have cognitive, social, and emotional capacities that are more
adultlike, thereby warranting parity in culpability and punishment. In reality, the
index offense is not a good predictor of recidivism, nor is it a reliable sign of one’s
level of maturity (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000a, 2000b). Although past behavior
is predictive of future behavior, incidence rates of violent behavior—even serious
violence—in adolescence are so high as to almost be considered common. For
example, approximately 40 percent of males and between 16 and 32 percent of
females in three regional samples (Denver, Pittsburgh, and Rochester) reported
engaging in at least one act of serious violence—such as aggravated assault, robbery, rape, and gang fights—before age 16 (Tatem-Kelley, Huizinga, Thornberry,
& Loeber, 1997). Yet most youth who engage in violence during adolescence do
not continue offending into adulthood. In fact, about 80 percent commit no
further acts of violence after age 21 (Elliott, 1994).
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If a juvenile’s age, physical development, and index offense do not reveal his
or her level of maturity and developmental status, how should that status be
assessed or measured? First, it is useful to define psychosocial maturity as it relates
to legally relevant decision making in juveniles. Cauffman and Steinberg (2000a)
have described it as “the complexity and sophistication of the process of individual decision-making as it is affected by a range of cognitive, emotional, and
social factors” (p. 743). Specifically, they outline three developmental capacities
that combine to shape that decision-making process. The first of these developmental capacities is responsibility. This is the ability to be self-reliant and unaffected by external pressure or influence in making decisions. The second is
perspective. This capacity has two components; one is temporal (i.e., the ability
to see and consider both short- and long-term implications of a decision) and the
other is interpersonal (i.e., the ability to take another’s perspective and understand
a different point of view). The third developmental capacity is temperance. This
is the ability to exercise self-restraint and to control one’s impulses (Cauffman &
Steinberg, 2000b; Steinberg & Schwartz, 2000).
The evaluator should assess directly those specific capacities relevant to psychosocial maturity, and not simply infer them from other characteristics or factors
that actually may not be related. Considering and presenting forensic issues in
developmental context will facilitate a more sophisticated juvenile forensic psychological examination (Grisso, 1998a).
Violence Risk
Whether juvenile offenders are processed in the adult or juvenile justice system,
issues regarding the risk for future violence are present at almost every stage
(Borum, 2000, in press; Borum & Verhaagen, in press; Grisso, 1998a). Initially,
there is a decision about whether an arrestee can be released into the community
pending a trial or hearing. At a sentencing or disposition hearing, the offender’s
violence risk often is a key factor in determining the level of security needed. And
if a juvenile is sentenced or released to community supervision, the supervision
plan must account for violence potential and how to prevent it.
Assessments of violence risk in children and adolescents differ from parallel assessments with adults. As noted, the key reason for this difference is that
juveniles are in a significant and simultaneous state of transition in multiple
spheres of development. Their patterns of behavior and personality generally are
less stable across time and contexts (Borum, 2002, in press; Grisso, 1998). Nevertheless, some assessment is necessary in order to manage risk and prevent future
violent behavior.
There are two distinguishable types of assessments for violence risk (Borum,
2000, in press; Borum & Reddy, 2001). The first is a general risk assessment, in
which the question is whether, and the extent to which, this juvenile might engage
in violent behavior toward anyone within a specified period of time. The second,
sometimes referred to as a “threat assessment,” is conducted when a youth has
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engaged in some behavior or communication that has brought him or her to official attention and caused someone be concerned or to raise the issue of potential
risk (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999; Fein, Vossekuil, Pollack, Borum,
Reddy, & Modzeleski, 2002; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998). In this circumstance, the
question is whether, and the extent to which, this juvenile might be on a pathway
toward (e.g., planning or preparing for) a violent attack directed at an identified
or identifiable target (Fein et al., 2002). Each type of assessment requires a somewhat different approach; however, we focus here on the general risk assessment
since it is more common to juvenile justice issues.1
The risk assessment should be tailored to its purpose, but most referral questions involve some implications for risk management or risk reduction (Borum,
in press). Because the ultimate goal is to prevent violent behavior, assessment
and management should be interactive and interdependent functions (Heilbrun,
1997). Lessons learned from decades of early research led to a clear conclusion that
assessments of violence risk must go beyond an assessment of the individual–
either as a source of information or as a focus of the evaluation.
Regarding sources of information that may prove of some value in conducting a risk assessment, although just having “more” is not necessarily better,
certainly information that goes beyond the examinee’s self-report is a good start
(Borum, 2000; Borum & Verhaagen, in press). The examiner should consider the
feasibility and usefulness of reviewing available records and interviewing collateral informants. A juvenile might have records from prior involvement with the
justice system or previous evaluations. Interviewing family members might
provide additional information or a new perspective on the juvenile’s history and
family or living environment. In some circumstances, this information may be
limited, but the value is that an evaluator with multiple sources is often better able
to gauge the quality and reliability of the information presented. Not all examinees will intentionally distort information, but being able to corroborate key facts
and hypotheses across multiple sources is beneficial, and better data lead to more
valid conclusions (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993).
Regarding the focus of the assessment, the field has moved from an exclusive focus on the individual as the subject of the assessment and toward a broader
appraisal and weighing of situational factors (Borum, 1996, 2000). The nature
and degree of “risk” being assessed is dynamic and highly dependent on context,
situations, and circumstances (National Research Council, 1989). This means that
a competent risk assessment of a juvenile must involve a careful review of social
and contextual risk factors as well as individual and historical ones.
To facilitate a systematic, comprehensive evaluation, an assessment model—
with accompanying instruments—has been developed and is referred to as struc1

For a more detailed description of a Threat Assessment model and its applicability with juveniles, particularly in a school context, please see Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999; Fein,
Vossekuil, Pollack, Borum, Reddy, & Modzeleski, 2002; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998; Fein, Vossekuil, &
Holden, 1995.
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tured professional judgment (SPJ). In the SPJ model, an evaluator conducts a systematic assessment of predetermined risk factors that have strong, empirically
established relationships with criterion violence. The evaluator considers the
applicability of each risk factor to the case and classifies its severity, but the ultimate determination of risk level is not based on a particular cutting score derived
from summing the items. The summary risk appraisal is based on the examiner’s
professional judgment, informed by a systematic appraisal of the relevant factors.
In this way, the SPJ model draws on the strengths of both the clinical and actuarial (formula-driven) approaches to decision making, and attempts to minimize
their respective drawbacks (Borum & Douglas, 2003).
The development of SPJ instruments for children and adolescents is a relatively new enterprise. Two instruments appear quite promising: the EARL (Early
Assessment Risk List), for use with children under age 12, and the SAVRY (Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth), for use with adolescents.
EARL2
The EARL-20B (Early Assessment Risk List for Boys) (Augimeri, Koegl, Webster,
& Levene, 2001) is an SPJ tool designed to aid evaluators in making judgments
about future violence and antisocial behavior among boys under the age of 12—
particularly those who exhibit behavioral problems and are considered to be at
high risk. Like most of the adult instruments, the protocol contains 20 risk items,
each of which is assigned a score of 0, 1, or 2 depending on the certainty and
severity of the characteristic’s presence in a given case. The 20 items are divided
into three categories, including six Family Items (e.g., Household Circumstances);
twelve Child Items (e.g., Developmental Problems); and two Responsivity Items.
In a preliminary research investigation with 378 boys and 69 girls in a court-based
intervention program for young offenders, the EARL demonstrated good interrater reliability and validity, with “high” scorers being much more likely than
“low” scorers to have a subsequent criminal conviction after age 12. The developers of this tool have created a parallel measure for assessing risk in young girls,
called the EARL-21G. The domain names are the same, but a few of the risk
factors are different than those included in the version for boys.
SAVRY 3
The SAVRY (Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth) (Bartel, Borum,
& Forth, 2000; Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2003) focuses specifically on violence
risk in adolescents. The SAVRY protocol is composed of 24 Risk items that are
2
Copies of the EARL-20B and EARL-21G can be ordered from Earlscourt Child and Family
Centre, 46 St. Clair Gardens, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M6E 3V4. 416-654-8981. Email:
mailus@earlscourt.on.ca. Web: www.earlscourt.on.ca.
3
More information on the SAVRY can be found on the Web at
http://www.fmhi.usf.edu/mhlp/savry/statement.htm Copies of the SAVRY can be ordered from
Specialized Training Services, 9606 Tierra Grande, Suite 105, San Diego, CA 92126. Telephone: (800)
848-1226. Web: www.specializedtraining.com.
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divided into three categories (Historical, Individual, and Social/Contextual), and
six Protective items. The risk items each have a three-level coding structure (High,
Moderate, and Low), and the protective items have a two-level structure (Present
or Absent). Specific coding guidelines are provided for each level. Preliminary estimates of reliability and validity have been consistently encouraging, even across
diverse and high-risk samples. Numerous studies in at least six different countries
are currently in progress.
Antisocial Behavior and Character
Since at least 1990, there has been a surge of interest in understanding and assessing antisocial processes and personality traits in children and adolescents. In the
late 1970s, Robert Hare began working on an assessment scale to measure
the construct of psychopathy as conceived by Herve Cleckley (1976). Research
on the instrument (ultimately known as the Hare Psychopathy Checklist or PCL)
progressed quickly and infused new energy in the study of antisocial personality.
By 1990, Hare and Adele Forth began to modify the items to explore whether
they might be applicable to adolescents (Forth & Burke, 1998). The preliminary
results were promising and spawned a generation of research on the developmental psychopathology of psychopathy and its measurement (Forth & Burke,
1998; Frick, 2002; Frick, Barry, & Boudin, 2000; Salekin, Rogers, & Manchin,
2001).
As conceptualized in adults, there are two distinctive dimensions that
characterize the construct of psychopathy (Vincent & Hart, 2002). The first,
Interpersonal/Affective, pertains to interpersonal transgressive disregard and
deficiencies in emotional experience such as conning, manipulation, and lack of
guilt and empathy. Frick (2002) has referred to these as “callous/unemotional”
traits. The second, Social Deviance, pertains to antisocial lifestyle and behavioral
patterns such as impulsivity and early behavioral problems. The construct is stable
across time and has been linked consistently with risk for violence and general
criminal behavior.
As this line in inquiry with juveniles has evolved, there have been serious concerns about the ascription of a psychopathic diagnosis or label to persons in an
active state of developmental transition. These concerns typically involve one or
more of three assertions: (1) personality disorders should only be diagnosed in
adulthood; (2) psychopathy cannot be reliably assessed in childhood/adolescence
because of developmental overlap; and (3) labeling a youth as a “psychopath” is
ethically problematic because of the potential consequences of such a pejorative
moniker (Edens, Skeem, Cruise, & Cauffman, 2001; Seagrave & Grisso, 2002).
Borum and Verhaagen (in press) propose four conceptual distinctions that
help to frame the discussion and evaluation of these arguments. The first is
whether the construct-related traits can even be measured in youth. A number of
empirical studies using the modified version of the PCL and other newly devel-
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oped instruments have attempted to measure these traits and processes in child
and adolescent samples. Largely, these efforts have met with success. The items
were assessed with consistency across examiners. The scales cohered psychometrically and their scores correlated significantly with related measures and constructs (Edens et al., 2001; Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). Overall, studies conducted
to date suggest at least that features of psychopathy can be reliably assessed in
children and adolescents (Frick, 2002; Salekin, Rogers, & Machin, 2001; Vincent
& Hart, 2002).
The second distinguishable question is whether that cluster of traits can be
used as a risk marker for violence risk. Much attention has been given to the Hare
PCL-R in forensic assessments, in part because of its robust utility in predicting
future violence. The instrument, however, was not developed as a measure of
violence risk, but of the clinical construct of psychopathy. It just happens that
the construct is strongly related to violence-related outcomes. Thus, if a cluster
of traits are identifiable and can reliably be assessed in juveniles, that cluster may
have certain correlates or serve as a reliable risk marker for certain outcomes, even
if it does not represent the Cleckley construct of psychopathy. Indeed, most
studies that have explored the correlates of psychopathic traits (or the instruments
that purport to measure them) in youth have found that the identified grouping
of traits is significantly related to risk for conduct problems and violent offending (Christian, Frick, Hill, & Tyler, 1997; Gretton, 1999; Frick, 1995; Frick,
O’Brien, Wootten, & McBurnett, 1994; Lynam, 1998). In one of the earliest
studies, Forth, Hart, and Hare (1990), for example, modified the PCL-R to apply
to youth and found that scores correlated with a number of relevant variables,
including number of postrelease violent offenses (r = .26) (Forth & Burke, 1998).
The third distinctive level is whether the identified cluster of traits actually
measures the construct of psychopathy itself, as developed by Cleckley and refined
by Hare. Contemporary conceptualizations of psychopathy suggest that it is a
chronic syndrome with symptoms that typically begin to emerge in childhood. If
that is true, then “true psychopaths,” or those who will show many traits of psychopathy across the lifespan, should—at some level—be identifiable before adulthood. The challenge, however, is that some young people may demonstrate traits
and behaviors consistent with psychopathy that are not stable and do not persist
into adulthood. Perhaps, then, those characteristics do not represent early signs
of nascent psychopathy (Edens et al., 2001; Seagrave & Grisso, 2002; Lynam,
2002). While recent research has measured psychopathy-related traits in young
people, there has been far less evidence that those traits are stable and persist into
adulthood or that those juveniles whose behaviors do persist are reliably
distinguishable from those who do not. Not all “psychopathic traits” evidenced
in childhood and adolescence are evidence of “fledgling psychopathy” (Lynam,
2002).
The fourth and final level pertains to the applicability of the label. That is,
whether, or in what circumstances it is appropriate to apply the label psychopath to
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someone before adulthood. The empirical element of this discussion rests on the
nature and quality of evidence for the construct validity of psychopathy, including,
as noted earlier, its longitudinal stability. There is also a more practical element,
however, that recognizes the pejorative nature of the term psychopath and the
potential for that label to assume “master identity” status for a juvenile. The term
and its derivatives carry connotations of extreme dangerousness and untreatability
that could negatively and unfairly affect perceptions of, and decisions about, a
young person (Edens et al., 2001; Seagrave & Grisso, 2002).
In light of these distinctions, what is the state of empirical evidence pertaining to arguments for and against the study and application of psychopathic
traits with juveniles? Borum and Verhaagen (in press) have described the state of
affairs as follows:
1. Argument: Personality disorders should only be diagnosed in adulthood.
The DSM-IVTR offers a clinical guideline—although not an absolute rule—that
personality disorders generally should not be diagnosed until an individual
reaches age 18 (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This does not imply,
however, that associated traits and behavioral patterns do not emerge until adulthood, but rather, that there should be sufficient time to determine that the symptoms observed are lifelong, maladaptive, and consistent across contexts, and that
they do result in functional impairment and/or significant distress. Accordingly,
it is not unreasonable to investigate or research psychopathic traits in preadulthood to understand better the developmental course of the disorder (Frick, 2002;
Lynam, 2002). Empirical studies conducted to date suggest that a cluster of traits,
similar to those that characterize psychopathy in adults, can reliably be identified—at least cross-sectionally—in children and adolescents (Edens et al., 2001;
Frick, 2002; Frick, Barry, & Boudin, 2000).
2. Argument: Psychopathy cannot be reliably assessed in childhood/adolescence because of developmental overlap. Some argue that psychopathy-related
traits such as impulsivity, egocentrism, or parasitic lifestyle virtually define the
developmentally normal course of adolescence. The concern is that there may be
too much overlap between normal and psychopathic personality traits and patterns to make a meaningful distinction, particularly among teens (Edens et al.,
2001; Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). There is some merit to these arguments, but the
implication seems to be a need for using age-appropriate bases of comparison.
Empirical studies suggest not only that the traits are assessable in juveniles, but
that it is possible to distinguish between those who are relatively “high” or “low”
with regard to a given characteristic and between those with a greater or lesser
number of them overall (Frick, 2002).
3. Argument: Labeling a youth as a “psychopath” is ethically problematic.
The rational arguments on this score are fairly compelling. The connotations of
the label are uniformly negative, and, as noted, the label itself is so powerful that
any information about a youth as an individual may be lost once this language is
applied. From an empirical perspective, the central fact to consider is that the
long-term stability of psychopathic traits in youth has not been definitively estab-
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lished. Thus, applying the label to a child or adolescent might not only be stigmatizing, it may be also inaccurate (Seagrave & Grisso, 2002). Some youth who
exhibit psychopathic traits are or are becoming “psychopaths”—but some,
perhaps many, are not. Without greater confidence in understanding the developmental course of the disorder and evidence that that the construct of psychopathy itself (not just associated traits) can be identified before adulthood,
extreme prudence and caution are warranted in any clinical description or
application.

PSYCHOLEGAL QUESTIONS INVOLVING YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Psychologists and other mental health professionals can work with delinquent
youth in two primary ways. Psychologists can assist judges and attorneys who are
charged with making important decisions about minors involved in the juvenile
justice systems by conducting specific forensic evaluations of the subjects of their
proceedings and providing them with important information about the youth’s
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive functioning that they would not otherwise
have. This should result in more informed and better decision making and dispositions. Additionally, psychologists can provide treatment and other interventions to juveniles and their families, the purpose of which is to bring about an
overall improvement in the youth’s emotional and behavioral adjustment and
functioning as well as to decrease the youth’s likelihood of reoffending. A review
of effective treatments for delinquent youth is beyond the scope of this chapter
(see Borum, 2003a; Frick, 2002; Hoge, 2001; Lipsey & Wilson, 1998; and Dowden
& Andrews, 1999, for such reviews). In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss
forensic evaluation of juveniles.
Transfer4 Evaluations
Although, since its inception a little over 100 years ago, the juvenile court has
served as the primary venue for adjudicating minors charged with offenses, not
all such youth remain under its jurisdiction. All states allow for some youth to be
tried in (adult) criminal court (Zimring, 2000). The transfer process is based on
the presumption that, although the majority of youth accused of law breaking
may show significant potential for rehabilitation, there is a subset of youth whose
criminal behavior is not primarily attributable to developmental factors, who are

4

Although we use the term transfer throughout this chapter to refer to the process that allows
for transfer of a minor to adult court for adjudication, it is noted here that other terms may be used
by jurisdictions (e.g., waiver, bindover, declination, certification) and different terms may refer to different procedures in various jurisdictions.
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likely to continue offending in a dangerous manner, and who present a special
threat to the community. Transfer of this subset of youth to the criminal courts,
which allows for imposition of more punitive sanctions and greater incapacitation, is considered necessary. Although some commentators have questioned
whether the transfer process brings about its intended effects, such as decreased
recidivism (see, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, 2000), and others have raised concerns
about whether it is applied consistently across jurisdictions (Dawson, 2000) or in
racially or sexually discriminatory ways (see, e.g., Bortner, Zatz, & Hawkins, 2000;
Dawson, 2000), some form of juvenile transfer provision remains in place in all
jurisdictions.
Although the process and conditions of transfer vary between jurisdictions,
Clausel and Bonnie (2002) identified three ways in which youth may come under
the jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system (see Dawson, 2002; U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1995, for reviews of state laws). Judicial waiver provides the judge with discretion in determining which cases should be transferred
to criminal court; legislative exclusion removes any discretion from the judge and
requires that certain classes of juveniles be tried in adult court; and prosecutorial
election confers on prosecutors the discretion to decide whether to file charges in
criminal or juvenile court for a specific subset of juveniles. Transfers via legislative exclusion and prosecutorial election are typically conditioned upon factors
such as the youth’s age (e.g., 16 and above), the youth’s history (e.g., a particular
number of prior delinquency adjudications), and the nature of the alleged offense
(e.g., violent offenses against persons). For example, in Florida, the state attorney must charge in criminal court any 16- or 17-year-old who is charged with possessing or discharging a firearm during the commission of drug trafficking or a
variety of violent offenses against persons (Florida Statutes 985.227 [2] [d], 2002).
In judicial waiver transfers, the judge is obligated to consider a variety of factors
identified by the specific state statute in making a decision about whether to waive
a juvenile to criminal court for adjudication. In many jurisdictions, the judge is
directed to consider certain factors that are psychological in nature, including
the youth’s maturity, amenability to treatment, and risk of reoffending (see, e.g.,
Florida Statute 985.226 [3] [c], 2002). It is for this subset of discretionary transfer cases that psychologists may be called on to evaluate a youth so as to better
inform the legal decision maker about these factors. In some cases, the psychologist may submit a report summarizing his or her findings or testify at a hearing
where the transfer decision is made.
As noted, psychologists are typically required to address three factors in
most discretionary transfer cases: the youth’s risk for future violent and nonviolent offending, the youth’s maturity, and the youth’s amenability to treatment. As
discussed, because the ultimate goal is to prevent violent behavior, assessment and
management should be interactive and interdependent functions (Heilbrun,
1997). Assessment must go well beyond assessment of the youth alone, given what
we know about the role of peers, the environment, and social context in violent
and nonviolent delinquent offending (Borum, 1996, 2000; also see above).
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Assessment of a youth’s amenability to treatment requires the examiner to
identify (1) the factors that may contribute to the examinee’s involvement in the
juvenile justice system, (2) effective treatments and interventions, and (3) any
impediments to effective treatment (Grisso, 1998a, 2002). Necessary for such an
assessment is an understanding of the youth and his or her particular adjustment
and needs, the youth’s environment and context, and effective interventions.
Andrews and Bonta (2003) provide a helpful template for evaluations of adult
and youthful offenders that emphasizes assessment of (1) the examinee’s relative
risk for reoffending, so that the necessary intensity of treatments and interventions can be identified (risk principle); (2) the offender’s particular needs, so that
the specific treatments/interventions can be proposed (need principle); and (3) the
learning style of the examinee, so that treatments/interventions can be offered in
a way that the examinee can best understand and incorporate (responsivity principle) (see also Hoge, 2002).
Not all treatments are equally effective. In the past few years, a number of
interventions have been developed that bring about clear reductions in delinquent
behaviors (see Borum, 2003a; Frick, 2002; Hoge, 2001; Lipsey & Wilson, 1998;
Dowden & Andrews, 1999, for a review and summary of some successful
approaches), whereas some more traditional interventions such as “building selfesteem” have not performed so well. Evaluators must be knowledgeable about
effective interventions and their availability in the community and recommend
them when appropriate.
Finally, as discussed in detail, the evaluator must keep in mind how the adolescent’s ongoing development may affect the assessment process, remembering
that assessing a juvenile is akin to “hitting a moving target.” The evaluator is
assessing the juvenile as he or she is maturing emotionally, cognitively, and physically. Although a general progressive trend may be expected, capacities may wax
and wane over time, and not all abilities or capacities may mature or develop
uniformly (see above).
Competence Evaluations
Competence to Confess/Waive the Right against Self-Incrimination
In one of its best-known decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona
(1967), ruled that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that any
confessions made by defendants and used against them in criminal proceedings
must be preceded by warnings informing them of their constitutional rights. In
Fare v. Michael C. (1979) the Supreme Court went on to hold that waiver of these
rights must be done “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” In Colorado v. Connolly (1986), the Supreme Court decided that confessions will likely be considered
voluntary as long as they are not the product of police coercion, as opposed to
coercion from non-law enforcement actors.
Juveniles’ ability to understand and meaningfully exercise their right against
self-incrimination has received increasing attention for the past 25 years, begin-
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ning with publication of results of an NIMH-funded study examining these
capacities in youth (Grisso, 1981). As in all forensic evaluations, examinations of
the youth’s ability to voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive the right
against self-incrimination and to confess require assessment of the juvenile’s functional psycholegal abilities as they may have been affected by behavioral, emotional, cognitive, or situational factors. Unlike many forensic evaluations,
however, competence to confess/waive Miranda rights evaluations are retrospective insofar as the focus of the evaluation is the youth’s mental state at a point in
time in the past—when the arrest and interrogation occurred. As such, the evaluator is required, as best he or she can, to reconstruct the youth’s ability to understand, comprehend, and exercise his or her Sixth Amendment rights at the time
they were ostensibly waived.
In these evaluations, the examiner must identify both developmental factors
that might have affected the relevant psycholegal abilities at the time of the arrest
and interrogation (e.g., cognitive, emotional, or behavioral problems or limitations) as well as situational factors that may have had an impact (e.g., time, nature,
and condition of the interrogation; the presence or absence of parents; intoxication). A review of these factors reveals that although some factors affecting a
youth’s ability to understand and exercise his or her Sixth Amendment rights are
more static and enduring in nature (e.g., intelligence), others are more dynamic
and less stable over time (e.g., intoxication).
According to the Supreme Court, in considering the validity of a confession
and the competence of a waiver of one’s right to avoid self-incrimination, the
courts are obligated to consider the “totality of the circumstances” (People v. Lara,
1967; Fare v. Michael C., 1979). Indeed, courts typically consider a variety of
factors, including those that are person centered (e.g., the youth’s age, IQ, level of
education, literacy, emotional and behavioral adjustment, level of intoxication,
prior contact with law enforcement officers) as well as environmental/situational
(e.g., when and where the interrogation took place, who was present during the interrogation, how the Miranda rights were presented to the detainee) (Oberlander,
Goldstein, & Goldstein, 2002; Frumkin, 2000; Oberlander & Goldstein, 2001).
Thus, although third-party information is critical in all forensic evaluations
(Committee on Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1991) accessing
collateral information is particularly important in competence-to-confess evaluations given their retrospective nature and the variety of factors that must be considered. Examining police reports and documentation of the interrogation process;
reviewing medical, academic, and mental health records; and interviewing the
arresting and interrogating police officers and other third parties who are familiar either with the youth or the circumstance of the interrogation (e.g., parents)
may provide critical information. Also important is a comprehensive assessment
of the youth’s emotional, cognitive, and behavioral functioning, based on review
of relevant records, psychological testing, and interviews. Finally, the examiner
should assess the youth’s ability to understand and exercise the Miranda warnings
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via structured testing (Grisso, 1998b; Gudjonsson, 1984) and conduct an interview to gain an understanding of his or her experience of the arrest and interrogation process.
The examiner should always keep in mind that the youth’s abilities and
capacities at the time of the evaluation are not what is of interest to the court and
may not be indicative of his or her abilities at the time of his or her arrest
and interrogation. Thus, it is incumbent upon the examiner to make clear that
any opinions offered about the youth’s psycholegal abilities at the time of the
arrest are inferred from his current capacities and accounts, as well as any relevant and available third-party information.
Competence to Proceed 5 with the Legal Process
The premise that persons accused of offenses must be competent to participate
in legal proceedings against them can be traced to at least 17th century Common
Law, and is well rooted in American law (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin,
1997; Stafford, 2002). In Dusky v. United States (1960), the Supreme Court ruled
that the Constitution requires a defendant to have “sufficient present ability to
consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings against him” (p. 789;
also see Chapter 9 in this volume for a review of criminal competence more
generally).
The Supreme Court, however, has never addressed what capacities are
required of juveniles participating in delinquency proceedings, and how factors
such as mental disorder, mental retardation, and cognitive “limitations”6 associated with normal development as they affect a youth’s capacity are to be considered. Such issues, of course, are less pressing when the juvenile justice system is
considered to be rehabilitative, non-adversarial, and a system that acts in the best
interests of the child. The issue of juvenile competency, however, has received
more attention in the past decade, likely in response to perceptions that the juvenile justice system has diminished its emphasis on rehabilitation and become more
punitive.
Approximately half the states specifically address the issue of competence
to proceed in juvenile court, and most states appear simply to have adopted
Dusky-like criteria that are employed in adult proceedings (Grisso, 1998a, 2002).
Contrary to what one might predict based on a review of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Gault, Kent, and Winship (see above), at least one court has deter5
We use the term competence to proceed, rather than competence to stand trial, since (a) the
former is more inclusive and reflects the law’s requirement that accused persons be competent
throughout their involvement in the justice process, and (b) the large majority of accused adults and
juveniles do not ever proceed to a trial or hearing; rather, some kind of plea or alternative adjudication is reached.
6
We place “limitations” in quotations since they are not truly limitations, but simply reflect
normal development.

ch35.qxd 9/24/2003 9:23 AM Page 886

886

RANDY OTTO AND RANDY BORUM

mined that juveniles need not be competent to participate in juvenile proceedings
since those proceedings are not punitive in nature (G.J.I. v. State of Oklahoma,
1989).
Principles for assessing juveniles’ competence-related abilities have largely
been drawn from the adult competence literature (see Chapter 9 in this volume
for a review of criminal competence more generally). As in all forensic evaluations, the focus of the competence evaluation is the juvenile’s functional psycholegal abilities as they may be affected by current mental, behavioral, and
emotional functioning. Some of the more important functional abilities include
both a factual and rational understanding of the charges, the allegations, possible sanctions, the adversarial nature of the legal process, and the roles of those
involved in the process (e.g., judge, defense attorney, prosecutor, witnesses). Also
crucial is assessment of the juvenile’s ability to work with his or her attorney, both
with respect to providing information of relevance (e.g., information regarding
the juvenile’s behavior and whereabouts at and around the time of the alleged
offense, information designed to assist the attorney in challenging prosecution
allegations and witnesses) and consider various legal strategies and options.
Important to remember is that the test of competence is one of capacity, as
distinguished from knowledge or willingness. Thus, juveniles who simply are ignorant about the legal system and its operation, the charges and allegations, or possible sanctions are not incompetent to proceed providing they have the ability to
incorporate and utilize such information in their decision-making process once it is
presented to them. Similarly, a juvenile who is capable of working with his attorney
or otherwise participating in the legal process but chooses not to do so for reasons
other than those that might be attributed to mental disorder, mental retardation, or
developmental “limitations” has the capacity to participate. Also important to note
is that the capacity required to be competent to proceed is not absolute, as indicated
by the Supreme Court’s references to “sufficient present ability” and “reasonable
degree of rational understanding” in Dusky (1960).
Although research indicates that older teenagers’ factual understanding of
the legal system and its operation is not much different from that of adults,
research examining adolescents’ decision-making processes and values suggests
greater differences in these areas (Grisso, 2000; Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Cauffman
& Steinberg, 2000a; Cauffman & Steinberg 2000b). Thus, of particular importance when evaluating juveniles’ competence to proceed is assessing their rational
understanding and decision making in addition to their factual understanding.
Not only should the examiner assess a youth’s knowledge of the legal system and
his or her case, but also how his or her emotional functioning and development
affects his or her reasoning about the case. For example, although a youth may
“know” that he faces a minimum of 30 years in prison for a charge of felony
murder, what can be said about how he might decide whether to accept a plea
agreement for 20 years (with a minimum of 17 in prison) and assess his chances
of acquittal? Are his abilities and decision-making processes the same as those of
a 32-year-old male who is charged with the same offense and who is presented
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with the same options? And if their decision-making processes and abilities are
different, does this raise questions about the 16-year-old’s capacity and competence to proceed?
As discussed earlier, evaluation of juveniles is complicated by their less than
complete and ongoing cognitive, emotional, and physical development. Thus,
when the examiner identifies specific deficits in a juvenile’s competence-related
abilities, the next task is to identify whether the deficit results from mental disorder, mental retardation, “limitations” associated with normal development, or a
combination of these factors. Identifying the root cause(s) of competence-related
abilities, of course, is crucial for determining the likelihood of “restoration” to
competence and the type of intervention necessary (see Chapter 9; Grisso, 1998a;
and Stafford, 2002, for a review of restoration issues).
Although a number of forensic assessment instruments have been developed
for assessing trial competence–related abilities of adults, no such instruments have
been developed for or normed on juveniles (see Grisso, 2002, and Stafford, 2002,
for reviews of the instruments used with adults). Thus, examinations of juveniles’
competence to proceed are necessarily clinical ones that are ideally tied to, or
anchored in, the relevant state law.
Mental State at the Time of the Alleged Offense/Sanity Evaluations
The insanity defense is one of the most controversial aspects of criminal law and
allows a select subset of persons to avoid criminal responsibility for what would
otherwise be criminal actions upon a determination that their mental state
affected their decision-making abilities or actions in some legally relevant and
important way. Exculpation is based on the presumption that criminal adjudication and the sanctions that follow should only be applied to those persons who
are in control and aware of their behavior. Almost all states employ some version
of the insanity defense, the use of which can be traced to ancient times, and a
number of different tests of insanity have been proposed (see Rogers & Shuman,
2000, and Chapter 31 for a more detailed review of the law of insanity and the
evaluation process). Not all states provide for an insanity defense in juvenile proceedings (or adult proceedings, for that matter), and it is not clear that provision
of such a defense for adults is required by the Constitution (Stephen Morse, personal communication, March 5, 2003).
Little has been written about the insanity defense as it applies to youth, presumably because the role of, or need for, the insanity defense with juveniles has
never been apparent, at least since the inception of the juvenile court. As noted
earlier, prior to establishing the juvenile court, youth ages 14 and older who were
accused of criminal acts were entitled to the same privileges and sanctions as
adults via the criminal justice system, presumably including the insanity defense
(Tanenhaus, 2000). Children between the ages of 7 and 14 were presumed incapable of forming criminal intent, but this was a rebuttable presumption, and
children below the age of 7 were simply considered to lack capacity to form the
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requisite criminal intent. Since the juvenile court is grounded in the presumption
that minors do not possess the same capacities as adults and that dispositions are
intended for rehabilitation, use of the insanity defense might be considered superfluous. Just as the juvenile justice system, at least historically and in theory, is
designed to rehabilitate rather than punish, so too does the insanity defense allow
for treatment, rather than punishment, of the individual. Thus, to provide a
defense that precludes punishment and provides for treatment in a system already
designed to treat rather than punish might be considered unnecessary. With movement toward a more sanction-oriented juvenile justice system, however, it could
be argued that there is a place for the insanity defense in juvenile proceedings.
Assessment of a juvenile’s mental state at the time of the offense will be
similar in structure and format to evaluations of adults in the criminal justice
system (see Chapter 8; Rogers & Shuman, 2000; Borum, 2003b, and Goldstein,
Morse, & Shapiro, 2002, for further discussion of the general evaluation process).
In conducting such evaluations of juveniles, however, the forensic psychologist
must consider how the minor’s delinquent actions might be related to, or
explained by, adolescent development or psychopathology. Although a number
of measures has been designed to assist in structuring mental state at the time of
the alleged offense/sanity evaluations, none has been developed specifically for
use with juveniles, nor have any such assessment techniques proven particularly
valuable (see Borum, 2003b; Goldstein, Morse, & Shapiro, 2002; Melton, Petrila,
Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997; Rogers & Shuman, 2000, for reviews). Thus, examinations of juveniles in this context are necessarily clinical ones that are ideally
tied to, or anchored in, the relevant state law.

Dispositional Evaluations
Dispositional assessments are the evaluations most frequently performed by psychologists who assess youth in the juvenile justice system. This should not be
surprising, since these evaluations are rehabilitation focused and identify any emotional, behavioral, environmental, or substance abuse problems that are related
to the youth’s offending, as well as appropriate interventions that will ultimately
improve the youth’s adjustment and decrease the likelihood of future involvement
with the juvenile justice system. Indeed, it was for this very purpose that the juvenile court and juvenile justice system was established. Essentially any factor that
may be related to the youth’s involvement with the juvenile justice system is to be
considered by the examiner, with interventions recommended as appropriate and
necessary. Because dispositional assessments may look very different depending
on the particular juvenile and his or her needs, no clear prescription for conducting such evaluations can be offered. However, all of the factors that are
assessed in waiver evaluations (discussed earlier) may be relevant in disposition
cases.
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CONCLUSION
For a little over 100 years, the juvenile court has been in place to account for the
special needs and concerns of youth who are involved with the legal system.
Although their focus and purpose has changed over time and with varying political agendas, the juvenile court and the juvenile justice system continue to emphasize interventions designed to rehabilitate youth. Forensic psychologists have made,
and continue to make, important contributions by giving legal decision makers a
better understanding of youth involved in the juvenile justice system and their treatment needs and also by developing interventions designed to meet their needs and
reduce the liklihood of future contact with the juvenile justice system.
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